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Evaluating the potential contribution of contract auctions  
to Agri-Environmental Policy efficiency:  










Auctions are a potentially suitable policy tool for increasing the efficiency of Agri-
Environmental Schemes (AES) through an improved allocation of contracts. In theory, 
through  the  auction  mechanism, farmers  have  incentives  to  reveal  their  compliance 
costs, helping to reduce information rents and increase policy cost-effectiveness. The 
aim of this paper is to simulate the potential contribution of auction mechanisms to the 
efficiency of AES in Emilia-Romagna (Italy). The results show advantages for auctions 
compared with traditional flat rate payments based on average compliance costs. How-
ever,  their performance  is  worse than flat payments  based  on  marginal  compliance 
costs. 
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  The EU Agri-Environmental Schemes (AES) may be seen as a collection of contracts 
in which the public administration (society) purchases public environmental goods or 
services from farmers. Since their inception in 1992, the design and implementation of 
AES’s has seen very little innovation, particularly at the level of individual measures. In 
the implementation of EU AES the public administration usually offers a payment de-
signed to compensate compliance costs (EC reg. 1698/2005). In the local implementa-
tion of such measures, this compensation is usually designed as a flat rate payment. The 
flat rate mechanism does not differentiate across farmers according to their compliance 
costs, and is likely to generate (important) rents to (some) participants. Various alterna-
tive payment mechanisms can be applied with the aim of reducing information asymme-
tries leading to overcompensation and increasing the efficiency of the measures in terms 
of participation/expenditure ratios. These include, in particular, self-selecting contracts 
obtained  though  mechanism  design  and  auctions  of  conservation  contracts  (Glebe, 
2008). The auction mechanisms are addressed in a growing body of literature concern-
ing public procurement in general (e.g. McAfee and McMillan, 1987; Laffont and Ti-
role, 1993; Klemperer, 2002). They are also the subject of an increasing number of ac-
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tual policy experiences involving the awarding of agricultural conservation contracts. 
By way of auctions, AES contracts are awarded through a competitive bidding mecha-
nism, in which farmers are expected to have higher incentives to reveal their true com-
pliance costs. Models for this kind of mechanism are proposed in the existing agricul-
tural economics literature (e.g. Latacz-Lohmann and Van Der Hamsvoort, 1997; 1998; 
Hailu and Schilizzi, 2004), but applications are still in their infancy in EU. However, 
auctions for conservation agriculture have been implemented in the United States and 
Australia and this mechanism is mentioned among the possible options under the EU 
regulatory  framework  for  rural  development  for  the  years  2007-2013  (EC  reg. 
1698/2005). 
  Auctions for awarding conservation contracts can be implemented using different 
mechanisms. A major distinction concerns the decision-making framework for the pub-
lic administration, which has two main alternatives: to establish a target of contracted 
land area or to establish the budget available. In both cases the farmer must set his price 
in response to the public administration’s contract offer. In the case of fixed target auc-
tions, the public administration is not able to determine the final overall expenditure in 
advance. This could be a problem for the public administration as this mechanism could 
result in excessive expenditure. This is solved in the case of a fixed budget which, how-
ever, has the disadvantage of not providing information in advance regarding the result-
ing amount of land under environmental contracts. The two options also can be repre-
sented through a different modelling approach. In the field of AES studies, the hypothe-
sis of budget constrained auctions seems to reflect the general policy problem better, as 
budgets are usually allocated to these programs in a more specific way compared to par-
ticipation targets. However, the existing literature offers little insight into fixed budget 
auctions (Schilizzi, and Latacz-Lohmann, 2005).  
  The aim of this paper is to develop an empirical model to simulate the potential con-
tribution of auction mechanisms to the efficiency of AES’s in Emilia-Romagna (North-
ern Italy). We focus on a simple budget constrained model of auction and compare it 
with two flat rate options. The two flat rate options are calculated by referring, in turn, 
to the average compliance cost and to the marginal compliance cost. 
  A common problem encountered in these kinds of models (both for the auctions and 
the flat rate option) is the estimation of the farmer’s compliance cost function. To this 
aim, we also develop a simple methodology to derive compliance costs from FADN 
data, based on the same rationale used in the calculation of compliance costs in the justi-
fication  of  payments  for  the  RDP  in  the  programming  period  2007-2013  (EC  reg. 
1698/2005) for the case study area. 
  The paper outline is the following: section 2 describes the methodology adopted, fol-





  In this paper we compare simulated auction performance (AC) with the simulated 
results of two alternative mechanisms: marginal flat rate payment (MFR) and average 
flat rate payment (AFR). 
  In the auction model (AC), the bidding behaviour of individual farmers is based on 20  AGRICULTURAL ECO￿OMICS REVIEW 
the budget constrained (BC) model proposed in Lactaz-Lohmann and Van der Hams-
voort (1997). The hypothesis is that the farmer can choose between a conventional pro-
duction technology and compliance with some agri-environmental prescription, generat-
ing respectively profit  0 Π  and  1 Π , perfectly known to the farmer. The farmer’s profit is 
expressed per hectare, without considering the agri-environmental payments, so that the 
difference can be used as a measure of compliance costs. 
  In order for it to be profitable to participate in the AES, the farmer must receive a 
payment that is at least equal to his compliance cost ( ) 0 1 Π Π - . However, under the 
auction mechanism, the payment is not certain. The farmer will submit a bid b if the 
expected utility in case of participation exceeds his reservation utility: 
  [ ] 1 0 0 ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) U Π b F b U Π F b U Π + - + >   (1) 
where  1 – F(b)  is the probability that the bid b is accepted, b is the individual farmer 
bid  and  () U ×   is  a  monotonically  increasing,  twice  differentiable  von  Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function. 
  We assume that there are no transaction costs in the preparation and implementation 
of the bid, that payments are only a function of the bid, and that farmers are risk neutral. 
The farmer’s problem is then to decide the optimal b which maximizes the expected 
utility (on the left hand side of equation 1) over the reservation utility (on the right hand 
side of equation 1). 
  The main determinant of this choice is the trade-off between the value of the bid and 
the probability that the bid is accepted: a higher bid increases the net profit in case of 
acceptance, but decreases the probability that the bid is accepted. If the farmer simply 
maximizes the net economic payoff, i.e. if   1 1 ( ) U Π b Π b + = +   and   0 0 ( ) U Π Π = ,  equa-
tion (1) can be simplified in: 
  [ ] 1 0 ( ) 1 ( ) 0 Π b Π F b + - - >   (2) 
  Maximizing equation (2) with respect to b, and taking first order conditions, the op-
timal bid ( *) b  is obtained as: 
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  In order to progress further, we need to introduce some assumptions regarding the 
distribution of the farmer’s expectations about the range of accepted bids. Considering 
the simplest option, we assume that expectations are uniformly distributed in the range 
of  , β β é ù ë û,  where  β  and  β   are  respectively  the  minimum  and  maximum  bids  that 
farmers expect to be acceptable to the public administration. Under this hypothesis the 
optimal bid can be obtained as: 
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s.t.      0 1 * b Π Π > - . 
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sum of the compliance cost plus the maximum expected bid, and the minimum expected 
bid.  The  optimal  bid  is  hence  an  increasing  linear  function  of  participation  costs 
0 1 ( ) Π Π -  and maximum expected bid  β . 
  In order to model the bidding behaviour of a population of farmers, we represent the 
compliance costs as a function of the area under agri-environmental contract, θ . We use 
() h θ  to represent the cumulative compliance costs and  () () () 0 1 h θ Π θ Π θ = - ¢  as the 
marginal cost, where the profit is a function of the area θ . In this case, the optimal bid 
can be also represented as a function of  θ , by applying equation 4 to the compliance 
costs of each additional hectare potentially under environmental contract: 
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  We  will  further  assume  that  the  sole  objective  of the  public  administration  is  to 
maximize participation, measured by the degree of uptake, without consideration, for 
example the value of different environmental services produced by different farmers. 
Under this hypothesis and further assuming the condition of a fixed budget (B) avail-
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  As this budget constraint will always hold with equality, from equation (7) it is pos-
sible to obtain the maximum area under contract ( *) θ  as:  
  () () 2 2
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  This result can be compared with the one obtained in the situation of a flat rate pay-
ment per hectare. We consider two options for this: marginal flat rate payment (MFR) 
and average flat rate payment (AFR). 
  In the first case (MFR), we assume that the public administration can fix the payment 
equal to the compliance cost of the marginal participating farmers; then the maximum 
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  This implies a greater degree of information about compliance costs on the part of 
the public decision maker, compared with the auction mechanism, at least for the farm 
in the left tail of the distribution. This is not completely unrealistic if measures are tar-
geted to some specific area that also is characterised by compliance costs different from 22  AGRICULTURAL ECO￿OMICS REVIEW 
the average. The effect would be a screening, restricting participants to only those hav-
ing costs below the resulting payment. This payment does not correspond to the optimal 
(less expensive) first best situation where each farmer is remunerated with exactly the 
amount corresponding to his compliance costs. In effect, considering this flat payment, 
a surplus is kept by those farmers who have a compliance cost which is lower than the 
flat payment. 
  In a more realistic context, and following the EU regulation, the public administra-
tion sets a payment (P) based on the average compliance cost of all farmers in the same 
area.  In  this  case  (AFR),  assuming  that  the  budget  allows  participation  only  for  a 
“small” group of farmers (i.e. those whose cost of compliance is below  P,  or, in other 
words, those located in the left tail of the cost distribution compared to the average-
costing farm), participation is simply determined by: 
  2 * B
θ
P
=   (10) 
  This also implies a rent (R) for individual farmers, that will be determined by the 
difference  () 2 * P h θ ¢ - . On the other hand, when R<0, the farmer is not expected to par-
ticipate according to profit maximizing behaviour. Let us define as 
av θ  the cumulative 
UAA  of  the  population  of  potential  participants,  ordered  by  increasing  compliance 
costs, corresponding to the position occupied by the average-cost farm. If B is “high” 
we can reformulate (10) as: 
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  The theoretical comparison between the three instruments is not straightforward, as it 
depends on the difference between  β  and the marginal cost on the one hand, and on the 
level of B compared to the total cost, on the other. 
  A variant of each of these three payment models is obtained by changing the assump-
tions about farmers’ incentive perceptions. In particular, we assume now that farmers 
expect  to  be  paid  a  sum  different  from  the  pure  compliance  cost.  Accordingly,  the 
money they want to earn from the transaction should cover  ( ) gh θ ¢  rather than  ( ) h θ ¢ , 
where g represents a coefficient indicating the ratio between the expected payment nec-
essary for participation to be considered as profitable by the farmers and the compliance 
cost. Assuming that the farmers know their costs, the coefficient g assumes values equal 
or greater than 1. The situation with g>1 could be justified by the presence of transac-
tion costs not detected in the computation of the compliance cost, or by an additional 
profit that farmers require to undertake the contract. The difference g–1 represents the 
share of this additional profit requirement, or hidden perceived cost, on the compliance   2010, Vol 11, ￿o 2  23 
cost. 
  Under these assumptions, the results of AC and MFR provided respectively in equa-
tion (8) and (9), are revised by substituting  ( ) gh θ ¢  for  ( ) h θ ¢ , which yields a reduction 
of the optimal θ . The effect of g > 1 on AFR in equation (10) is less straightforward, as 
the marginal compliance cost of the participants will normally be lower than the pay-
ment (for the “low” participation rate discussed above). Consequently, there is a change 
in the outcome of the measure only when  ( ) gh θ P > ¢  for a share of farmers willing to 
participate according to (10). In this case, P being fixed, there will be an uptake lower 
than the one calculated in (10) and, as a consequence, some budget would remain un-
used even if   2 * av θ θ £ . 
 
 
Case study and results 
  The methodology described in the previous section has been applied to a simulation 
exercise of an auction for agro-environmental services in Emilia-Romagna (Northern 
Italy). Two different agri-environmental measures (AEMs) are considered: a) the provi-
sion of a generic agri-environmental good that substitutes wheat cultivation (AEM1); 
and b) the replacement of conventional wheat cultivation by integrated wheat cultiva-
tion (AEM2). AEM1 is an hypothetical measure the economic properties of which are 
very similar to various landscape improvement measures applied in the area in both the 
2000-2006 and 2007-2013 programming periods. The main difference between the ac-
tual measures implemented and AEM1 is that, in order to simplify, we assume no in-
vestment or maintenance costs, so that the compliance costs are only connected to the 
opportunity cost by way of the substitution of a cultivated crop. In addition, we ap-
proximate this opportunity cost by assuming the replacement of a specific crop (wheat) 
while in reality a differentiated mix of crops is normally replaced when the measure is 
implemented. AEM2 is a real measure which was very popular in Emilia-Romagna, 
particularly in the programming period 2000-2006. The measure actually concerns a 
number of crops, but we restrict our attention to wheat. In both cases the compliance 
cost function is obtained on the basis of FADN data. We consider all the FADN farms 
that cultivated wheat in both 2004 and 2005 in Emilia-Romagna (231 farms) and calcu-
lated the compliance cost as: a) for AEM1, the income loss due to the replacement of 
wheat; and b) for AEM2, the cost of changing the conventional cultivation to the inte-
grated one. In the case of AEM1, the income forgone is simply that which was gener-
ated by wheat, assuming a total replacement with a non-profitable/non-costly land use. 
In the case of AEM2 the computation of compliance costs entails that the estimation of 
0 Π  and  1 Π .  0 Π  is taken as the income derived from FADN.  1 Π  is calculated on the 
basis of FADN data by:  
i)  reducing the gross revenue;  
ii)  adjusting cultivation costs; and  
iii)  adding administrative and transaction costs.  
  The percentage adjustment for i) and ii), and the estimation of the value of iii) are 
those used for the justification of payments in Emilia-Romagna and have been derived 
from the regional RDP (Regione Emilia-Romagna, 2007). The compliance cost for each 
measure is first calculated on individual FADN farms. The farms are then ordered ac-24  AGRICULTURAL ECO￿OMICS REVIEW 
cording with increasing compliance costs, and the compliance costs are plotted against 
the cumulative UAA, assuming that each farm in the FADN sample represents a frac-
tion equal to 1/231st of total wheat UAA in Emilia-Romagna. The estimation of the 
marginal cost function for each measure is achieved by interpolation of these individual 
costs as a function of the cumulative UAA, using a 3
rd degree equation. 
  The cost function is used directly for the calculation of the expected outcome in the 
cases of average payment (AFR) and marginal payment (MFR), following equations 9 
and 10, respectively. In the case of auctions (AC), the bid function is first obtained by 
applying equation (5) to the individual costs level. In analogy with the costs function, 
the resulting bids are then plotted against the cumulative wheat UAA and interpolated 
with a 3
rd degree equation. In the calculation of the bid, we have assumed  0 β = , whilst 
β  has been assumed equal to the average of the payments for the same measures in the 
RDP programming period 2000-2006. 
  In order to take into account the possibility of extra-profit seeking by farmers, we 
also need an estimation of the coefficient relating the actual expected remuneration and 
compliance costs (g). In an auction experiment carried out with students, similar to the 
one conducted by Schilizzi and Latacz-Lohmann (2005), we found that a bidder expects 
a  10-20%  “profit”  over  compliance  costs.  We  then  took  an  extra-profit  expectation 
equal to 20% (i.e.  1,2) g =  and re-estimated the performance of auctions compared to 
the other mechanisms for the two measures considered. 
  Figure 1 shows the compliance cost to measure AEM1 (substitution of wheat), that 
illustrates a relevant degree of heterogeneity, captured by the interpolate. This function 
provides a particularly good fit (R
2 = 0,977).  The dotted line represents the bid calcu-
lated through equation (8) and the interpolation of the results. 
 
(AEM1)
y cost =  -5E-13x3-1E-07x2+ 0,0126x
R² = 0,9772




































Figure 1.  Cost and auction bid as a function of participating UAA– Substitution of wheat culti-  2010, Vol 11, ￿o 2  25 
vation  
y cost = 2E-13x3 -5E-08x2 + 0,003x + 41,273
R² = 0,9586








































  Figure 2 differs from figure 1 as it refers to the situation of integrated wheat cultiva-
tion (AEM2). The fit is also good in this case (0,9586). Costs are to a large extent repre-
sented by paperwork and administrative costs that are assumed in the RDP to be fixed 
across  farms,  yielding  a  flatter  compliance  cost  function  compared  to  the 
AEM1measure. As a result, the function has a positive intercept and is flatter in the cen-
tral part. 
  Table 1 reports the results of the simulation, represented by the maximum UAA par-
ticipating in the in the three payment mechanisms in the case of a generic environmental 
measure that substitutes the wheat cultivation (AEM1) with 4 different budget levels. 
  The performance of auctions is always located between marginal flat rate and aver-
age payment results. The difference decreases when the budget increases in the mar-
ginal flat rate situation and has an opposite trend in the average payment case. In par-
ticular, considering a fixed budget of 250.000 euros, the maximum UUA up-taken with 
the marginal flat rate approach is more than 5 times the area up-taken with the auction 
approach. This rate decreases for larger budgets; for example, with a budget of 2 million 
euros, it is less than 2. The auction results are closer to the average payment output 
(about 0,5). 
  If we hypothesise that farmers have an expectation of profit equal to 20% of the 
compliance costs, the difference between auctions and contracts with the average flat 
rate payment is almost negligible, whilst the difference reduces more visibly with the 
marginal flat payment. This occurs because, in this last option, the marginal payment is 
affected by the increased compensation expectation (including profit). On the contrary, 26  AGRICULTURAL ECO￿OMICS REVIEW 
in the auction and average flat options the effect of profit expectations are partially “ab-
sorbed” by, respectively, the maximum bid component and the difference between P 
and the marginal compliance cost. 
 
Table 1. Comparison of different payment mechanisms in case of elimination of wheat 
cultivation (AEM1) (% of total UUA of wheat in Emilia-Romagna) 
Budget (million of euro)   
0,25  0,5  1  2 
g=1 
Marginal flat rate payment (MFR)  2,72%  3,87%  5,54%  7,95% 
Auction (AC)  0,53%  1,04%  2,00%  3,77% 
Average flat rate payment (AFR)  0,26%  0,52%  1,03%  2,06% 
MFR/AC   5,13  3,73  2,76  2,11 
AFR/AC  0,49  0,50  0,52  0,55 
g=1,2 
Marginal flat rate payment (MFR)  2,46%  3,50%  4,99%  7,14% 
Auction (AC)  0,53%  1,04%  1,99%  3,71% 
Average flat rate payment (AFR)  0,26%  0,52%  1,03%  2,06% 
MFR/AC   4,63  3,37  2,51  1,92 
AFR/AC  0,48  0,50  0,52  0,56 
 
  Similar trends are shown in table 2 which refers to AEM2 (integrated wheat cultiva-
tion). 
 
Table 2. Comparison of different payment mechanisms in case of replacement of con-
ventional wheat cultivation by integrated wheat cultivation (AEM2) (% of to-
tal UUA of wheat in Emilia-Romagna) 
Budget (million of euro)   
0,25  0,5  1  2 
g=1 
Marginal flat rate payment (MFR)  3,63%  4,81%  8,17%  13,87% 
Auction (AC)  1,59%  3,08%  5,82%  10,77% 
Average flat rate payment (AFR)  1,08%  2,15%  4,31%  8,62% 
MFR/AC  2,28  1,56  1,40  1,29 
AFR/AC  0,68  0,70  0,74  0,80 
g=1,2 
Marginal flat rate payment (MFR)  2,38%  4,17%  7,11%  11,99% 
Auction (AC)  1,52%  2,93%  5,53%  10,26% 
Average flat rate payment (AFR)  1,08%  2,15%  4,31%  8,62% 
MFR/AC   1,57  1,43  1,29  1,17   2010, Vol 11, ￿o 2  27 
AFR/AC  0,71  0,74  0,78  0,84 
  For the same policy mechanism and budget, the up-taken area is much higher in this 
case, due to the lower compliance costs per hectare. Also, compared to AEM1, the auc-
tion mechanism performs better in this case. The auction results are still in the middle 
between  the  other  two  mechanisms,  hence  auctions  perform  better  than  the  average 
payment and worse than the marginal flat rate payment, but the relative differences with 
the best mechanism (MFR) are smaller than in the previous measure. This is due to the 
fact that the cost function is flatter and that, particularly in the case of higher budgets, 
the  gap  between  the  marginal  and  average  payment  mechanisms  tends  to  narrow 
sharply. 
  When the simulations include a farmer’s profit expectation, the effect is similar to 




  The study carried out in this paper shows clear advantages for auctions compared 
with traditional flat rate payments based on average compliance costs. On this basis, the 
variability of compliance costs seems to justify the application of complex contract al-
location mechanisms such as auctions, while a flat rate payment calculated on the aver-
age of all compliance costs overcompensates the farmers in the left tail of the cost func-
tion (those actually getting involved in the measures given the available budgets). 
  However, our results also confirm that auctions could have some limitations. In par-
ticular, we show that a marginal flat payment, considering only the left part of the cost 
function, could have a much higher rate of participation than auctions with the same 
budget. The feasibility of such a payment strongly depends on the information available 
to public decision makers. However, it also calls for higher attention to “cost targeting”, 
i.e. focusing payment justification on the costs of the farmers who would be most likely 
participate, rather than on the average, and on their connection with identifiable loca-
tions/characteristics. When the simulations include a farmer’s profit  expectation, for 
example 20% of compliance costs, the auction’s performance is closer to the efficiency 
of the marginal flat rate contract. 
  In addition, though not directly addressed in this paper, some well-established limita-
tions raised in the literature apply to auctions. The efficiency benefits associated with 
auctions  are  strongly  affected  by  farmers’  expectations  about  the  transaction  costs, 
budget levels and maximum payment levels. When we restrict the population of farmers 
through smaller “auction basins”, the auction’s performance could be affected by the 
farmer’s knowledge of the compliance costs of competitor bidders or by explicit collu-
sion. The circulation of information and the possibility of comparing costs create an 
information advantage for farmers that could generate individual surpluses and ineffi-
ciency in the auction mechanism. 
  The lack of disaggregated data influences both simulation results and the ability to 
design efficient auctions. In fact, when the data are not able to capture the real hetero-
geneity of compliance costs, the different mechanisms show similar performance levels. 
The use of simple computation strategies as adopted in this paper is not completely sat-
isfactory. However, such strategies hint at the fact that heterogeneity matters and should 
be considered more explicitly in ex-post compliance cost estimations. 28  AGRICULTURAL ECO￿OMICS REVIEW 
  Altogether, this study confirms that, in spite of the potential drawbacks, auctions de-
serve greater attention from public decision makers, as well as further research to sup-
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